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The Value of Perception
KEITH ALLEN
University of York
This paper develops a form of transcendental na€ıve realism. According to na€ıve realism, veridical perceptual
experiences are essentially relational. According to transcendental na€ıve realism, the na€ıve realist theory of
perception is not just one theory of perception amongst others, to be established as an inference to the best
explanation and assessed on the basis of a cost-beneﬁt analysis that weighs performance along a number of
different dimensions: for instance, ﬁdelity to appearances, simplicity, systematicity, ﬁt with scientiﬁc theo-
ries, and so on. Rather, na€ıve realism enjoys a special status in debates in the philosophy of perception
because it represents part of the transcendental project of explaining how it is possible that perceptual experi-
ence has the distinctive characteristics it does. One of the potentially most interesting prospects of adopting
a transcendental attitude towards na€ıve realism is that it promises to make the na€ıve realist theory of percep-
tion, in some sense, immune to falsiﬁcation. This paper develops a modest form of transcendental na€ıve real-
ism modelled loosely on the account of the reactive attitudes provided by Strawson in ‘Freedom and
Resentment’, and suggests one way of understanding the claim that na€ıve realism is immune to falsiﬁcation.
1. Transcendental Na€ıve Realism
According to the version of the na€ıve realist theory of perception that I will take as represen-
tative, veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational: veridical perceptual experi-
ences are constituted at least in part by the mind-independent objects and properties in our
environment that they are experiences of. Because on this view veridical perceptual experi-
ences are essentially relational, a particular perceptual experience could not have occurred if
the subject had not been perceptually related to precisely those elements of their environ-
ment.1 In this respect, na€ıve realist theories of perception differ from common kind theories
of perception, like sense-datum or representationalist theories, which allow that how things
are with the subject is constitutively independent, at least on a particular occasion, of how
things are in their environment. According to common kind theories, it is possible for the
subject to have fundamentally the same kind of experience whether or not the environment
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1 For defences of na€ıve realism, see, for example, Martin (2002), Campbell (2002, 2014), Stoneham (2008),
Fish (2009), Brewer (2011), Logue (2012). Na€ıve realists disagree about exactly how na€ıve realism should
be characterised: for instance, whether it should be understood as a theory about what perceptual experi-
ences are essentially (Byrne and Logue 2008), or whether there are perceptual experiences, as distinct from
perceivings (Stoneham 2008). However, I will set these disagreements aside here and work with a repre-
sentative form of na€ıve realism.
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is as it is perceived to be. This could either be because when we perceive we are related to
different kinds of objects, sense data, that are distinct from things in our environment; or it
could be because perceptual experiences are not essentially relational at all, but rather repre-
sent things in our environment as being a certain way, and are veridical just in case these
things are as they are represented as being.2
The aim of this paper is to develop and defend a version of a position that I will call
transcendental na€ıve realism. Transcendental na€ıve realism involves adopting a speciﬁc
kind of meta-philosophical attitude towards na€ıve realism: it involves regarding the na€ıve
realist theory of perception from a ‘transcendental standpoint’. There are different forms
that transcendental na€ıve realism can take, corresponding to different ways of understand-
ing na€ıve realism, its motivations, and exactly what adopting the transcendental attitude
involves. However, in very broad terms, the transcendental na€ıve realist will not see
na€ıve realism simply as one philosophical theory amongst others, to be defended by
inference to the best explanation and to be assessed on the basis of a cost-beneﬁt analysis
that weighs performance along a number of different dimensions: for instance, ﬁdelity to
appearances, simplicity, systematicity, ﬁt with scientiﬁc theories, and so on. Viewed from
the transcendental perspective, na€ıve realism has a special status amongst philosophical
theories; indeed, for the transcendental na€ıve realist, na€ıve realism will be, in some sense,
immune to falsiﬁcation. The transcendental na€ıve realist takes seriously the perspective of
consciousness and the nature and structure of conscious experience. From this perspec-
tive, na€ıve realism is part of the transcendental project of explaining how it is possible
that perceptual experience has the distinctive characteristics that it does.
By way of illustration, consider, the prominent line of argument for na€ıve realism that
na€ıve realism articulates and explains the phenomenal character of experience, or ‘what it
is like’ to be a subject of experience.3 Perceptual experiences appear to put us into con-
tact with the mind-independent world. They are not only ‘transparent’, in the sense that
when we reﬂect on our experience we are aware of mind-independent objects and their
properties, and not anything else. But moreover, perceptual experiences arguably appear
to involve the unmediated presence of mind-independent objects and their properties,
such that objects and properties in our environment themselves determine the phenomenal
character of our experience. This, for instance, is one way of understanding C.D. Broad’s
(1952: 5) suggestive description of visual experiences as ostensively ‘saltatory’ and ‘pre-
hensive’: visual experiences appear to ‘leap the spatial gap’ between us and the mind-
independent environment, and put us in a touch-like contact with mind-independent
objects and their properties.4 For a transcendental na€ıve realist, the claim that na€ıve real-
ism articulates and explains the phenomenological character of perceptual experience
should not be understood as the claim that na€ıve realism is (merely) the best explanation
of ‘what it is like’ to be a subject of experience. Rather, the transcendental na€ıve realist
will see na€ıve realism as providing an account of how it is possible that conscious
perceptual experience puts us into contact with things in our environment, as it appears
2 For representative forms of sense-datum theory, see, for example, Price (1932) and Robinson (1994). For
representative forms of representationalist theory, see, for example, Evans (1982), Burge (2010), and Sie-
gel (2010).
3 For a version of this argument, see e.g. Martin (2002).
4 For further discussion, see e.g. Fish (2009), Kalderon (2011, 2018), and Allen (forthcoming). Compare
Crane and French’s (2015) discussion of the thesis that they call ‘Openness’.
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to: the unmediated presence of mind-independent objects and their properties is only pos-
sible because perceptual experience is essentially relational, and what we are related to in
perception are elements of our mind-independent environment.
Similarly, consider the equally prominent epistemological argument for na€ıve realism
that na€ıve realism explains how we can refer to, think about, and acquire knowledge of
mind-independent objects.5 A transcendental na€ıve realist will not understand this as an
inference to the best explanation: that na€ıve realism provides (merely) a better explana-
tion than competing theories of perception of how experience fulﬁls its distinctive epis-
temic roles. Rather, a transcendental na€ıve realist motivated by this kind of consideration
will see na€ıve realism as a condition of the possibility of perceptual experience having
these distinctive epistemic characteristics: it is only possible to refer to, think about, and
acquire knowledge of mind-independent particulars because perceptual experience is
essentially relational, and what we are related to in perception are elements of our mind-
independent environment.
Transcendental na€ıve realism is arguably not a new position. Versions of this approach
may perhaps be found in Kant (see Allais 2015, Gomes 2017), Merleau-Ponty (see Allen
forthcoming), and Putnam (1999). The position has similarities to the disjunctivist theory
of McDowell (1982, 2008), who uses transcendental arguments to motivate a form of
representationalism that rejects the common kind assumption.6 Indeed, given that contem-
porary na€ıve realism developed largely against the background of neo-Kantian Oxford
Realism (see Kalderon and Travis 2013), prominent contemporary na€ıve realists like Mar-
tin, Campbell, and Brewer might themselves be best understood as transcendental na€ıve
realists, at least to the extent that the phenomenological and epistemic arguments that
they use to motivate na€ıve realism can be understood as transcendental arguments.7
This paper develops a concrete illustration of one form that transcendental na€ıve real-
ism can take, modelled loosely on Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’. One aim of
approaching the issues in the philosophy of perception indirectly, via a comparison with
a debate in a different area of philosophy, is to provide a way seeing a familiar debate in
the philosophy of perception from a different perspective. Strawson’s ‘Freedom and
Resentment’ represents a promising comparator for a number of reasons. As well as
being well-known, it promises to provide a way of bringing out connections between per-
ception and value. It also has the advantage of representing a fairly modest form of tran-
scendental approach; as such, it is more likely to appeal to—or at least, less likely to
rankle with—the sensibilities of contemporary analytic philosophers of perception than a
more full-blooded form of transcendentalism. It will hopefully be particularly appealing
5 For versions of this argument see, for instance, Campbell (2002, 2014) and Brewer (2011).
6 McDowell’s disjunctivist theory is not a form of na€ıve realism if it is taken to be an essential commit-
ment of na€ıve realism that perceptual experiences are most fundamentally non-representational: McDow-
ell seeks to explain the relationality of perception in terms of its representational content. For further
discussion see Sotoriou (2013: 107) and Allen (forthcoming). Note that not everyone takes this to be an
essential commitment of na€ıve realism, in which case McDowell’s view can be understood as a form of
na€ıve realism (see e.g. Crane and French 2015), and thereby a form of transcendental na€ıve realism.
7 This way of understanding Campbell’s version of the epistemic argument for na€ıve realism, for instance,
is suggested by claims like ‘I will argue that if we are to acknowledge the explanatory role of experience
of objects, we have to appeal to what I call a Relation View of experience’ (2002: 114, emphasis added).
However, I will not consider here the exegetical question of whether contemporary na€ıve realists are best
understood as transcendental na€ıve realists.
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to contemporary na€ıve realists, given that contemporary na€ıve realism is a theory that has
its roots in the neo-Kantian Oxford Realist tradition, of which Strawson is a key ﬁgure.
Nevertheless, the comparison is not without its limitations. ‘Freedom and Resentment’
is in many ways a puzzling paper, whose argument is difﬁcult to pin down, and which
has spawned a large literature of its own. And although the outlook developed and
defended in this paper is broadly Strawsonian, I will argue that at certain points the com-
parison, crucially, breaks down.
§2 starts by providing a brief outline of some of the key aspects of Strawson’s argu-
ment in ‘Freedom and Resentment’. §3 draws a parallel to the debate between na€ıve real-
ists and common kind theorists. §4 extends the comparison by emphasising the
importance of acknowledging the value that we ascribe to the engaged, ﬁrst person per-
spective. In §5 I argue that the parallel to ‘Freedom and Resentment’ breaks down inso-
far as the view that the comparison suggests—and indeed, the view of perception that
Strawson himself defends—is not a na€ıve realist theory of perception, but rather a form
of common kind theory. However, I also argue that the ofﬁcial Strawsonian position fails
to meet the desideratum that Strawson himself lays down: that of respecting the engaged
perspective. §6 concludes by considering whether, and in what sense, a form of transcen-
dental na€ıve realism loosely modelled on Strawsonian lines can be said to be immune to
falsiﬁcation.
2. Freedom and Resentment
‘Freedom and Resentment’ concerns the apparent conﬂict between determinism, the the-
sis that all our actions are causally determined, and the reactive attitudes we experience
when we engage in inter-personal relationships: for example, feeling resentment in
response to acts of ill-will, or feeling gratitude in response to acts of kindness. Straw-
son’s aim is to try to effect a reconciliation between the ‘optimist’ who thinks that free
will and determinism are compatible, and the ‘pessimist’ who thinks that they are not.
The pessimist thinks that genuine, metaphysical, free will is—or would be—necessary
to justify the reactive attitudes, as well as social practices like punishment and moral
approval and condemnation more generally. The pessimist represents two different posi-
tions: the incompatibilist, who thinks that the reactive attitudes and the social practices of
punishment, moral approval and condemnation are not justiﬁed; and the libertarian—typ-
iﬁed, for Strawson, by the transcendental idealist—who thinks that they are justiﬁed, and
so who thinks that human actions are not causally determined in the way that the truth of
determinism requires. The optimist, meanwhile, represents a particular kind of compati-
bilist who thinks of, and attempts to justify, the reactive attitudes and social practices like
punishment and moral reward in ‘objective terms’, as appropriate given their role in the
effective and efﬁcient regulation of social behaviour (1962/2008: 2).
As Strawson’s optimist understands it, determinism is the view that all actions are
causally determined in the way that we regard actions to be causally determined in cer-
tain kinds of ‘bad case’: for instance, cases involving very young children and the
severely mentally ill. But as a matter of what he elsewhere calls ‘descriptive metaphysics’
(1959), Strawson argues that this understanding of determinism misrepresents ‘the facts
as we know them’.
Strawson distinguishes between two different kinds of case in which we ordinarily
think of the reactive attitudes as inappropriate (1962/2008: 7–10). The ﬁrst kind of case
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does not involve thinking of an agent as being such that reactive attitudes towards them
are inappropriate in general; it is just that a certain action, in certain circumstances, does
not merit a particular reactive attitude such as gratitude or resentment. These are situa-
tions in which may say of someone that they didn’t realise what they were doing, or
couldn’t help doing what they did because (for example) they were under duress. The
second kind of case—which might involve very young children or the severely mentally
ill—is one in which we do not think of the person as the appropriate object of the reac-
tive attitudes more generally (or at least, not for a certain period of time). Thinking of
someone like this involves taking an objective attitude towards them.
Strawson argues that the truth of determinism, as understood by the optimist, requires
thinking of all human actions on the model of the second kind of case; after all, deter-
minism is not the view that whenever anyone acts considerations of the ﬁrst kind (e.g.
inattentiveness, duress) are always operative (1962/2008: 11). But ordinarily when we
adopt the objective attitude towards someone in the second kind of case we do not do so
because we assume that determinism is, in general, true. Rather, we adopt the objective
attitude because we think that the person is incapacitated in some way: for instance,
because they are too young, or they acted out a fantasy (1962/2008: 13). Hence Straw-
son’s claim that the optimist’s understanding of determinism misrepresents the facts as
we know them.
Strawson concedes that there is some rational sense in which the optimist’s position is
an intelligible philosophical doctrine. It is intelligible to the extent that we are able to
adopt towards everyone the same detached, objective attitude that we adopt in the second
kind of ‘bad case’: we understand what it is for action to be causally determined, so we
understand (in some sense) what it would be for all action to be causally determined.
But whilst Strawson thinks that determinism so understood is not self-contradictory, and
indeed there may even be some general truths that could be theoretical grounds for it, he
nevertheless thinks that the thesis is not practically intelligible. As he puts it, the belief
in this form of determinism:
is, for us as we are, practically inconceivable. The human commitment to participation in
ordinary inter-personal relationships is, I think, too thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for
us to take seriously the thought that a general theoretical conviction might so change our
world that, in it, there were no longer any such things as inter-personal relationships as
we normally understand them. (1962/2008: 12)
According to Strawson, the reactive attitudes are essential to our ordinary understanding
of inter-personal relationships: ‘The existence of the general framework of [reactive] atti-
tudes itself is something we are given with the fact of human society’. Questions of the
justiﬁcation of the reactive attitudes can, and do, arise within this framework. But the
framework as a whole ‘neither calls for, nor permits, an external ‘rational’ justiﬁcation’
(1962/2008: 25).
3. Na€ıve Realism and Resentment
The comparison that I want to develop and explore starts from the observation that the
optimist’s claim that all actions are determined in the way that they are in the ‘bad case’
is structurally similar to the common kind theorist’s claim that all perceptual experiences
are of fundamentally the same kind as they are in certain kinds of ‘bad case’ of
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hallucination and illusion. According to the na€ıve realist, perceptual experiences are
essentially, or most fundamentally, relational: they consist in the obtaining of a relation
of conscious awareness between perceiving subjects and things in their environment. It
follows that there is a fundamental psychological difference between ‘good’ cases and
‘bad’ cases. According to the common kind theorist, by contrast, the ‘good’ case in
which we veridically perceive our environment, and the ‘bad’ case in which don’t, are
mental events of the same fundamental kind. This is either because perceptual experi-
ences involve the awareness of sense-data that are distinct from ordinary material objects,
and so which are directly present in both ‘good’ and ‘bad cases’; or it is because percep-
tual experiences are essentially representational mental events, that are veridical just in
case the perceiver’s environment is as it is presented as being.
Adapting the line of reasoning that Strawson deploys against the optimist, the na€ıve
realist can argue that common kind theories misrepresent ‘the facts as we know them’.
Mirroring Strawson’s account of the two kinds of case in which reactive attitudes are
inappropriate, we can think of two kinds of situation in which subjects lack perceptual
contact with the world. In the ﬁrst, we don’t think that the subject has lost perceptual
contact with the world completely; it’s just that particular experiences they are having, in
particular situations, are misleading. So, for instance, suppose that someone sees a patch
of light on a path as a stone, a tilted penny as elliptical, or the lines of a Muller-Lyer
image as unequal in length. Assuming, at least for the sake of argument, that these experi-
ences involve a local loss of perceptual contact with the environment, misperceiving one
aspect of the scene is nevertheless consistent with veridically perceiving the rest of the
scene: for instance, the path and trees alongside it, the colour and position of the coin, or
the book in which Muller-Lyer illusion is printed.8 Perceivers in these kinds of cases can
themselves normally unmask the illusion by further perceptual investigation: for instance,
by viewing the object from a different perspective or under different conditions. And even
where illusory experiences within a subject are systematic and pervasive, such as the col-
our experiences of people who are colour-blind or the blurred experiences of people with
myopia, it isn’t plausible to suppose that these perceivers have lost perceptual contact
with the world completely; it’s just that certain aspects of the world are unavailable to
them. These are cases of illusion, but there are similar cases of hallucination. Suppose,
for example, you are in your bedroom at night about to fall asleep and ‘insert’ a dead rel-
ative into the otherwise veridically perceived scene. These kinds of case involve (at best)
the local suspension of perceptual contact with the environment. The second general kind
of case, by contrast, involves a wider incapacitation. So, for instance, in these kinds of
case the subject may be suffering from severe mental illness, be subject to the whims of a
neuroscientist meddling with their cortex, or be in the Matrix.
The truth of the common kind assumption is not normally taken to involve the claim
that whenever we perceive, considerations of the ﬁrst kind are always operative: that we
8 Indeed, whether these kinds of case involve any loss of perceptual contact with the environment is con-
troversial. In some cases of illusion there may plausibly be aspects of the mind-independent environment
that we remain in contact with, and which explain how things appear: for instance, patches of light, or in
the case of constancy illusions like the tilted penny, ‘apparent’ properties that are relational mind-inde-
pendent properties of things in our environment (e.g. Schellenberg 2008, Allen 2018). Alternatively, it
might be suggested that although experiences themselves sustain complete contact with our environment,
we are nevertheless disposed in certain circumstances to make erroneous judgments about how things are
on the basis of experience (e.g. Fish 2009, Brewer 2011). However, I will set these questions aside here.
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always misperceive every aspect of a scene, or that every object we see is really an hallu-
cination. The truth of the common kind assumption seemingly requires thinking of all
perceptual experiences on the model of second kind of case. But nor do we ordinarily
think that subjects in the second kind of case—those cases involving a wider incapacita-
tion—are not perceptually related to their environment because we think, in general, that
the common kind assumption is true. Rather, we ordinarily think that subjects are not in
perceptual contact with their environment in these kinds of cases because we can tell
some other story about why they are perceptually incapacitated. So like the optimist, the
common kind theorist can therefore be said to misrepresent ‘the facts as we know them’.
Of course, the na€ıve realist may concede that there is some rational sense in which
common kind theories are intelligible. We know that there are ‘bad cases’, in which
experiences do not put us into perceptual contact with the world as the na€ıve realist
understands it, as involving the unmediated presence of objects and their properties. This
is what happens in cases of hallucination and perhaps illusion. The falsity of na€ıve real-
ism is rationally intelligible to the extent that we can adopt towards all our experiences
the same detached, objective attitude that we adopt to these ‘bad cases’: we understand
what it is for experiences not to put us in contact with the world in the way that the
na€ıve realist conceives of it, so we understand (in some sense) what it would be for no
experiences to put us into contact with the world in the way that the na€ıve realist con-
ceives of it. These views are not self-contradictory, and there may even be theoretical
grounds for them—namely different versions of the Arguments from Illusion and Halluci-
nation, which attempt to generalise from ‘bad cases’ to ‘good cases’ via either the subjec-
tive indiscriminability of veridical and non-veridical experiences, or their similar
proximate causal aetiology in the brain. But the na€ıve realist might nevertheless argue
that these theories are not practically intelligible. To paraphrase Strawson, they might
suggest that:
“The human commitment to perceptual contact with the world is, I think, too thoroughgo-
ing and deeply rooted for us to take seriously the thought that a general theoretical con-
viction might so change our world that, in it, there was no longer perceptual contact with
the world as we normally understand it”.
Just as Strawson argues that the reactive attitudes are integral to inter-personal relation-
ships as we ordinarily understand them, the na€ıve realist may suggest that ‘The existence
of the general framework of perceptual contact is something we are given with the fact
of the world’. Legitimate questions about whether we are in perceptual contact with the
world can, and do, arise within this framework. But the framework to which perceptual
contact is integral neither calls for, nor permits, an external ‘rational’ justiﬁcation.
4. Perceptual Utilitarianism and the Value of Perception
I will return to the claim that na€ıve realism is beyond external ‘rational’ justiﬁcation in
§6. But ﬁrst I want to explore in more detail the comparison with ‘Freedom and Resent-
ment’, and in particular the claim that na€ıve realism articulates a core element of our con-
ceptual scheme.
An initial response to this Strawsonian line of argument is that common kind theories
of perception, like sense-datum and representationalist theories, can provide an
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understanding of ‘perceptual contact’ which—though it falls short of the na€ıve realist’s—
is sufﬁcient to explain our perceptual engagement with the world. These views can
explain our perceptual engagement with the world insofar as they are able to explain the
link between perception, belief, and action: the world causes in us experiences (under-
stood either in terms of sense-data or representations), which in turn cause our beliefs,
and these in turn cause us to act in various ways. Moreover, it is still possible for com-
mon kind theorists to draw a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases. Just as causal
compatibilists in the free will debate argue that the truth of determinism is consistent
with an understanding of ‘free action’ that makes experiencing reactive attitudes appropri-
ate, so long as the action is caused in the right way, the common kind theorist can say
that the essentially non-relational nature of perceptual experience is consistent with
understanding veridical perceptual experiences as putting us into ‘contact’ with the world,
so long as they are caused by the subject’s environment in the appropriate way.
But arguably this doesn’t get to the heart of the matter. One way of bringing this out
is by comparing the common kind theorist to Strawson’s compatibilist optimist, who
attempts to justify the appropriateness of the reactive attitudes on utilitarian grounds, in
terms of the ‘efﬁcacy of. . .regulating human behaviour in socially desirable ways’ (1962/
2008: 2). Strawson describes this as a form of ‘incomplete empiricism, a one-eyed utili-
tarianism’ (1962/2008: 25), that ‘is not a sufﬁcient basis, it is not even the right sort of
basis, for these practices as we understand them’ (1962/2008: 4). For Strawson, adopting
this kind of objective attitude towards the reactive attitudes and their value seemingly
leaves out something vital to our understanding of them: it overlooks the engaged per-
spective of someone participating in ordinary inter-personal relationships, who is prone
to experiencing gratitude and hurt-feelings. The vital thing that they leave out:
can be restored by attending to that complicated web of attitudes and feelings which form
an essential part of moral life as we know it, and which are quite opposed to objectivity
of attitude. (1962/2008: 24)
For Strawson, the reactive attitudes are not merely instruments for regulating human
behaviour; rather, on a personal level, they are expressions of moral attitudes (1962/
2008: 27).
Common kind theorists who, like Strawson’s optimist, would seek to explain our per-
ceptual contact with the world in terms of the beliefs and actions to which perceptual
experiences give rise can be thought of as offering a similarly ‘utilitarian’ account of per-
ception and its value. Common kind theories that treat experiences in this way arguably
leave out something vital, namely the perspective of the engaged subject. What it is they
leave out can be restored by attending to your experience of, and engagement with, the
world. Just as the reactive attitudes are merely not instruments for regulating social inter-
action, so we may say that perceptual experiences are not merely instruments by which
we navigate the world. Rather, by relating subjects to things in their environment, percep-
tual experiences are an expression or manifestation of our being-in-the-world, and the
fact that we are bodily perceiving subjects embedded in a mind-independent world.9
9 This way of putting the point is inspired by Merleau-Ponty; see Allen (forthcoming) for further discus-
sion.
8 KEITH ALLEN
If this is right, then it suggests that it would be misguided to try to motivate na€ıve
realism on equally ‘utilitarian’ grounds: for example, as the theory that best explains
why perceptual experiences are instrumentally valuable in virtue of their role in allow-
ing us to navigate the world. This doesn’t address the basic problem with common
kind theories. Rather, the pull of na€ıve realism is visceral, even moral; the na€ıve real-
ist should be liable to ﬁnd themselves in a similar position to Strawson’s libertarian
pessimist, who experiences ‘emotional shock’, or even offense, at the optimist’s claim
that punishment and the reactive attitudes can be justiﬁed on utilitarian grounds
(1962/2008: 22). At any rate, if the na€ıve realist does think of na€ıve realism as neces-
sary to explain the epistemic role of perceptual experience—for instance in enabling
us to refer to, think about, and acquire knowledge of mind-independent objects—the
knowledge of the mind-independent world that perception provides should itself be
thought of as an expression or manifestation of our being-in-the-world, and not merely
instrumentally valuable.10
This may explain the feeling it is possible to have—and also the impression that na€ıve
realists are sometimes liable to give—that there is something distasteful, perhaps even
grotesque, about common kind views that deny our perceptual contact with a mind-inde-
pendent world. This kind of sentiment is reﬂected in Hume’s description of his sceptical
doubts as inducing ‘melancholy and delirium’ (1739–40: 1.7.7, 175), and is nicely
expressed by Russell in his autobiography when he describes rejecting British Idealism.
This, he says, felt like:
a great liberation, as if I had escaped from a hothouse on to a wind-swept headland. I
hated the stufﬁness involved in supposing that space and time were only in my mind. I
liked the starry heavens even better than the moral law, and could not bear Kant’s view
that the one I liked best was only a subjective ﬁgment. In the ﬁrst exuberance of libera-
tion, I became a naive realist and rejoiced in the thought that grass is really green, in
spite of the adverse opinions of all philosophers from Locke onwards. (1959: 48)11
Indeed, the sense that our perceptual experiences—though, of course, they do enable us
to navigate the world—are not merely instruments for navigating the world may be part
of what lies behind the intuitive resistance that many people feel towards the prospect of
plugging into an experience machine that would guarantee them a lifetime of pleasurable
experiences. Nozick uses the intuitive resistance to this possibility to argue to there is
more that matters to us than the kinds of pleasure and pain that our experiences give rise
to. At least part of what is objectionable about permanently plugging into an experience
machine, according to Nozick, is that it denies us perceptual contact with reality:
plugging into an experience machine limits us to a man-made reality, to a world no dee-
per or more important than that which people can construct. There is no actual contact
with any deeper reality, though the experience of it can be simulated. (1974: 43)
10 See §6 for further discussion of this theme.
11 Compare Stroud’s claim that attempts to dispel the disappointment we are likely to feel in response to
the claim that we are ‘imprisoned’ behind a veil of appearances provide only cold-comfort: ‘It is natural
and perhaps always advisable for a prisoner to try to make the best of the restricted life behind bars. But
however much more bearable it makes the prospect of life-imprisonment, it should not lead him to deny
the greater desirability, let alone the existence, of life outside’ (1984: 34).
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Although Nozick’s primary aim is to argue that we don’t think of experiences as valuable
because they are instruments for deriving pleasure, this is part of a more general, non-
instrumental view of the value of experience:
What we want and value is an actual connection with reality. . ..To focus on external real-
ity, with your beliefs, evaluations, and emotions, is valuable in itself not just as a means
to more pleasure or happiness. And it is this connecting that is valuable, not simply hav-
ing within ourselves true beliefs. (1989: 106)
For Nozick, perceptual contact with a mind-independent world is not valuable because of
what it allows us feel or do; it is intrinsically valuable.
This is not to say that there can be no value in plugging into an experience
machine, putting on a virtual reality headset, or taking mind-altering drugs. These
experiences—like forms of imaginative engagement, such as daydreaming or engaging
with ﬁction—can also be valuable in their own way. The thought is just that there is
something distressing about the idea that these experiences might permanently exclude
or replace our genuine contact with the world. Perhaps particularly telling in this
respect—connecting up the discussion of perception with the discussion of the reactive
attitudes—are the kinds of perceptual experiences involved in ordinary inter-personal
relationships: when we look in the eyes of a loved one, touch a lover, or hear the
resentment in someone else’s voice. The resistance to plugging into the experience
machine does not depend solely on the prospect that the experiences we will enjoy
will be unique to us. If others were also plugged into the machine in such a way that
our individual experiences were coordinated with each other, and so we occupied dif-
ferent perspectives in the same virtual world, then this would still be distressing (cf.
Nozick 1989: 107). It is not just the lack of contact with the physical world that is
distressing; part of what is distressing is the lack of contact that we would thereby
have with other people.
5. The Common Kind Theory and the Engaged Perspective
So far I have emphasised the importance of recognising the engaged, ﬁrst person per-
spective in giving an account of perceptual experience. A second line of objection at
this point is that acknowledging the value of perception from the ﬁrst person perspec-
tive is perfectly consistent with accepting a common kind theory; indeed, it is pre-
cisely this combination of views to which the comparison with ‘Freedom and
Resentment’ points, and which Strawson himself defends in his writings on percep-
tion.
Strawson’s aim in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ is to effect a reconciliation between
the optimist and the pessimist. Strawson wants to encourage the optimist to recognise
the lacuna that the pessimist ﬁnds morally objectionable in their defence of compati-
bilism, but without thereby rejecting determinism; his hope is that ‘there might be a
formal withdrawal on one side [the pessimist’s] in return for a substantial concession
on the other [the optimist’s]’ (1962/1998: 2). What Strawson thinks the optimist needs
to recognise is the engaged perspective of a moral subject; but, contrary to the pes-
simist, he does not think that recognising this requires us to resort to the ‘obscure
and panicky metaphysics’ of libertarianism. Rather, he thinks (or seems to think) that
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recognising the value of the engaged perspective is consistent with a commitment to
determinism.12
This points to a tension in the comparison that I’ve been drawing so far. The na€ıve real-
ist may seem more like the pessimistic libertarian than the Strawsonian compatibilist who
seeks to combine a belief in determinism with a recognition of the value of the engaged
perspective. Taking the analogy seriously, it might be suggested that the conclusion we
should draw is not that common kind theories of perception are practically inconceivable,
but rather that what is practically inconceivable are just versions of the common kind the-
ory that think of perceptual experiences in objective terms: for instance, versions of ‘belief
theories’ of perception according to which perceptual experiences are just the acquiring of
beliefs (e.g. Armstrong 1968), forms of representationalism according to which perceptual
experiences are themselves belief-like mental events (for example, because the content of
experience is conceptual, e.g. McDowell 1994), or perhaps forms of reductive naturalism
that attempt to explain perceptual experiences in purely physical terms (e.g. Tye 2000).
The more authentic Strawsonian position might seem to be a version of the common kind
theory that recognises the distinctively subjective point of view.
This would be consistent with the theory of perception that Strawson himself defends.
Against the sense-datum theorist, Strawson insists that perceptual experience typically
presents itself as an awareness of a mind-independent world. Hence, if you ask someone
to describe their experience, it would be natural for them (at least if they were a rather
sophisticated na€ıve subject, of the kind that you might meet at Oxford high table) to say
something of the following kind: ‘I see the red light of the setting sun ﬁltering through
the black and thickly clustered branches of the elms; I see the dappled deer grazing in
groups on the vivid green grass. . .’ (1979: 97). But Strawson is not a na€ıve realist, for
whom perceptual experiences are essentially relational; indeed, for Strawson, contempo-
rary na€ıve realism is symptomatic of a ‘disorder’ affecting much recent philosophical
thought, which attempts to ‘minimize or reduce or even, in extreme cases, to deny the
reality of what I shall unashamedly refer to as inner or subjective experience’ (1998a:
292). Rather, Strawson thinks of veridical perceptual experiences and hallucinations and
illusions as mental events of fundamentally the same kind, that are differentiated in terms
of the causal relationship that they stand in to that which they are experiences of. Though
he does not himself characterise his view this way, we can perhaps think of Strawson’s
view in terms of views suggested by two of his pupils: either, as Evans (1982) argues, a
form of intentionalism according to which the content of perceptual experience is non-
conceptual; or, as Cassam (2014) suggests, a non-reductive form of intentionalism
according to which the representational content of experience is determined by conscious,
sensational aspects of experience.13
Strawson’s inclination towards determinism, and his commitment to the common kind
theory of perception, reﬂect his more general commitment to a form of naturalism. For
12 Modulo the qualiﬁcation that Strawson confesses to be unsure exactly what the thesis of determinism is
(1962/2008: 1).
13 It should be noted, however, that neither view is entirely unproblematic from a Strawsonian perspective.
On the one hand, it isn’t clear that Evans’s view ﬁts with Strawson’s insistence that perceptual experi-
ences are ‘thoroughly permeated—saturated, one might say’ with the concepts employed in judgments
made on the basis of experience (e.g. 1992: 62). On the hand, the distinction that Cassam draws between
different ‘layers’ of experience—the representational and the non-representational—may not ﬁt neatly
with Strawson’s criticisms of sense-datum views which think of experiences in two stages (1992: 62).
THE VALUE OF PERCEPTION 11
Strawson, the objective and the participant perspectives are really just two different per-
spectives that it is possible to take on one and the same thing. Even though these stand-
points appear to be radically opposed, once the relativity of perspectives is
acknowledged, he thinks that there is no genuine tension between them (e.g. 1979: 59).
However, Strawson’s attempts to reconcile the engaged and objective standpoints, both
in general and in particular cases, face a number of problems. In general, to effect an
equitable reconciliation between the manifest and scientiﬁc descriptions of the world,
there cannot be a reason to prefer one description as capturing the world ‘as it is really
is’ at the expense of the other. Strawson’s suggestion that what is ‘real’ is relative to our
perspective can be understood as attempting to meet this desideratum by denying that
there is a perspective-independent reality, in something like the way that you might think
that there are no perspective-independent facts about whether or not cabbage is disgust-
ing. On this view, aspects of the manifest image would be real relative to the perceptual
perspective, not real relative to the scientiﬁc perspective, and there would be no further
fact of the matter about the way the world is that would allow us say that either of these
descriptions is a more accurate representation of reality than the other. Put in these terms,
however, this is liable to sound like it involves a potentially unappealing form of anti-
realism.14
Certainly Strawson himself seems to prefer the description of the world provided by
science as the description that captures how the world ‘as it is in itself’. This comes out in
his response to Snowdon, another of his students, who defends a disjunctivist account of
perceptual experience of the kind that na€ıve realists often appeal to in order to explain
cases of hallucination. According to Strawson, the view that veridical perceptual experi-
ences are essentially relational requires us to suppose that there are logical relations
between ‘natural items’, as opposed to logical relations between descriptions of natural
items; and this, he thinks, is tantamount to being a ‘category howler’ (1998b: 314; see also
1979: 136–7 and 1998a: 289–90). The implication is that for Strawson it is ultimately only
the scientiﬁc descriptions that adequately characterise the ‘natural items’, and so the
description of the manifest image of the world is ultimately a mere description.15
These problems with the general structure of Strawson’s attempt to reconcile the
participant and objective perspectives mirror concerns about the attempted reconciliation
in particular cases. The Strawsonian complaint against the optimist is that they think of
attitudes and experiences in objective terms, and so miss out what is vital to the partici-
pant standpoint. In the case of perception, however, this lacuna arguably cannot be ﬁlled
simply by pointing out that perceptual experiences are mental events with distinctive
qualitative characters—that there is ‘something it is like’ to be a subject of experience—
and suggesting that this qualitative character can be explained by appealing to non-con-
ceptual representational contents or conscious sensational properties of experience. The
concern is that this still fails to take seriously the engaged perceptual perspective, and in
particular the distinctive sense in which perceptual experience appears to put us in
14 Compare Stroud’s (1984) objection to Carnap’s structurally similar suggestion that existence questions
are only intelligible internal to a linguistic framework—although unlike Carnap, Strawson does not think
that we are able to choose which framework to employ (see §6 below).
15 For further discussion of Strawson’s general attempt to reconcile the manifest and scientiﬁc images, see
e.g. Stroud (2000: 183–190) and Allen (2016: 183–5).
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contact with the mind-independent world, where this is understood in the na€ıve realist’s
sense as involving the unmediated presence of mind-independent objects.
According to the common kind theorist, the very same mental event could be occur-
ring, at least on a particular occasion, whether or not the world is as it appears to be.
Whether the experience is a veridical representation of the environment depends on
whether it is causally related in the appropriate way to that which it is a representation
of. But from the engaged perceptual perspective, our experiences arguably do not appear
to be distinct causal effects of an independently existing world; they do not present them-
selves as the last link in a causal chain that starts with their objects. Rather, they appear
to put us into contact with things in our environment in a way that is inconsistent with
this kind of causal mediation. As A.D. Smith, for example, puts the point:
when we perceive, we are not necessarily aware of a causal interaction between us and
the world. . .Perceived objects do appear simply to be there. For consciousness they have
an unmediated presence. (2002: 69)
Because the very same mental event could be occurring whether or not the world is as it
appears to be, the common kind theorist cannot explain why the phenomenal character of
an experience appears to be determined by mind-independent objects and their properties
by appealing to a relation of conscious awareness to those objects and properties. The best
that they can do to explain this distinctive aspect of the engaged perspective is to appeal
to a particular kind of representational content, or if they take seriously the claim that per-
ceptual experience is relational, a relation of conscious awareness to something else: sense
data that are distinct from mind-independent objects and their properties.16 But neither
fully explains our perceptual contact with the mind-independent environment. This is why
Broad, for example, argues that although visual experience is ostensibly saltatory and pre-
hensive of objects in our environment, this appearance ultimately cannot be taken at face
value. Only na€ıve realism explains how it is possible that perceptual experience puts us
into contact with the mind-independent world: perceptual experience involves the unmedi-
ated presence of mind-independent objects because it is essentially relational, and what we
are related to in perception are mind-independent objects and properties.17
In defending the causal theory of perception, Strawson argues that the causal theory is
implicit in our pre-theoretical view of ourselves and our relationship to the world ‘from
the very start’ (1992: 61). In support of this conceptual claim, Strawson argues that the
assumption of the causal dependence of experiences on their objects is necessary to
ground the assumption that our perceptual experiences are generally reliable; this in turn
is necessary to ground the belief that perception is a way of coming to form true beliefs
about the mind-independent world; and these beliefs, in turn, count as knowledge given
their causal relationship to the world:
16 See, for instance, Price’s insistence that although there is much we can doubt when we see a material object
like a tomato, we cannot doubt the ‘‘direct’ presence’ of something that is red and round (1950: 3).
17 An alternative line of response to the na€ıve realist at this point would be to challenge the description of
the engaged perspective as involving a kind of unmediated presence of mind-independent objects, such
that the phenomenal character of experience is determined by those objects and their properties. I will
not defend this description here, except to say that it is widely accepted that this is at least how experi-
ence seems, even by those (like Broad) who think that this is not how it is. For further discussion see
Allen (forthcoming).
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the minimum that seems to be involved in the notion of sense perception generally yield-
ing true judgements about an objective spatio-temporal world is that there should be some
pretty regular relation of dependence of the experience enjoyed in sense perception on
the way things objectively are. . .this is, in the broadest sense, a notion of the causal
dependence of the experience on the objective features in question. . .It is not something
we discover with the advance of science, or even by reﬁned common observation. It is
conceptually inherent in a gross and obvious way in the very notion of sense perception
as yielding true judgements about an objective spatio-temporal world. . .Of course, what
we do ﬁnd out by reﬁned or scientiﬁc observation and investigation is how this general
relation of causal dependence is actually realized, what forms it takes, what mechanisms
are involved in it. (1992: 60–1; see also 1979: 51)
But there are two important slides in this line of argument. The ﬁrst is from the claim that
experiences depend on the world to the claim that experiences causally depend, in the
broadest sense, on the world. The second is from the claim that experiences causally
depend, in the broadest sense, on the world, to the claim that experiences causally depend
on the world in the more speciﬁc Humean sense that they are logically distinct existences.
The ﬁrst transition would be denied by those who think that the world (in effect) provides
reasons (as distinct from causes) for experience (e.g. Hyman 1992), or by someone like
Merleau-Pony (1945) who thinks that the environment ‘motivates’ experience, where
motives are distinct from both reasons and causes.18 The second transition would be denied
by causal pluralists who allow that there can be causal relations that are not Humean causal
relations between logically distinct existences. On this view, for instance, our experiences
may causally depend the mind-independent objective world in the broad sense that the
world ‘makes a difference’ to our experience. But this need not be say that perceptual
experiences causally depend on the world in a more restrictive sense, such that they are
logically distinct existences standing at the end of a ‘process’ that begins with the object.19
Fully capturing the sense that perceptual experience puts us into contact with a mind-
independent world arguably requires an understanding of the way that experience
depends on the world than is different to that offered by Strawson—if not in terms of a
non-causal dependence, then at least in terms of a different kind of causal dependence.20
But although this way of making sense of the distinction between the engaged and objec-
tive perspectives requires a different metaphysical picture to that presented by Strawson,
it arguably does not requires us to have recourse to ‘obscure and panicky metaphysics’—
or at any rate, not the ‘obscure and panicky metaphysics’ of anything like a full-blooded
transcendental idealism. One way of reconciling the two perspectives, for instance, is to
18 A slightly different way of resisting this step would be to argue that there are no perceptual experiences,
just perceivings, and that perceivings are the wrong kinds of things to stand in causal relations. See
Stoneham (2008), and compare Valberg’s (1992: 120–8) ‘horizonal’ conception of experience.
19 For the distinction between ‘difference-making’ and ‘process’ conceptions of causation, see Woodward
(2011). For a defence of this kind of causal pluralism, see Allen (2016: 91–110). For further discussion
of Strawson’s argument for the causal theory, see Snowdon (1998) and Roessler (2011).
20 It is possible to have similar reservations about Strawson’s attempt to reconcile pessimists and optimists in
the free will debate. Allais (2014), for example, argues that we cannot provide an adequate account of how
we can elect to give up warranted resentment when we forgive someone if we understand their actions as
caused by beliefs, desires, and other psychological states. Rather we need to understand others as choosing
to act for reasons that make certain kinds of actions intelligible; and this sort of free action, Allais argues,
cannot itself be understood in deterministic causal terms, but instead needs to be understood in terms of a
different kind of causality, namely ‘the capacity to initiate a new causal sequence in a way which is not a
necessitated function of previous states of the universe and the laws of nature’ (2014: 51).
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think of them as providing complementary descriptions of different aspects of one and
the same world. Whereas the scientiﬁc image describes the causal mechanisms that bring
about the occurrence of perceptual experiences, perceptual experiences themselves are
essentially relational events that are causally enabled by the processes described by
science. It will be natural, on this approach, to think of the different aspects of the world
that the different perspectives disclose as closely related, for instance via some kind of
supervenience thesis; but they are nevertheless distinct.21
6. Beyond Justiﬁcation?
Part of the promise of the transcendental approach is that it renders na€ıve realism, in
some sense, immune to falsiﬁcation. In the ﬁnal section I want to consider whether, and
in what sense, this promise can be fulﬁlled.
Like Strawson’s approach to the apparent conﬂict between determinism and the
reactive attitudes on which it is modelled, the form of transcendental na€ıve realism
that I have developed is not an ‘ambitious’ form of transcendental na€ıve realism. I
have not tried to guarantee the truth of na€ıve realism by embedding it within the
framework of transcendental idealism, something which we might worry really would
involve appealing to the ‘obscure and panicky metaphysics’ of the transcendental
ego.22 Nor has it been argued that the rejection of na€ıve realism is incoherent, mean-
ingless, or otherwise rationally unintelligible. In this respect, the Strawsonian-inspired
form of transcendental na€ıve realism differs from stronger forms of transcendental
na€ıve realism which insist, for example, that a condition of the possibility of distin-
guishing between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases on particular occasions is that we have pre-
viously had experience of the ‘good’ case (e.g. Merleau-Ponty 1945: lxxx, 310–1).
This would represent an ambitious form of transcendental na€ıve realism because it
would rule out the challenge to the na€ıve realist theory of perception as either false
or meaningless: if a condition of the possibility of framing an intelligible sceptical
challenge is that we have had perceptual contact with the world, then the challenge is
false; otherwise, it is unintelligible.23 The concern with ambitious forms of transcen-
dental arguments like these is that it seems sufﬁcient to draw the distinction between
‘good’ and ‘bad’ case that we believe that we have experienced reality, not that we
actually have.24
But although Strawson’s approach to the conﬂict between determinism and the reac-
tive attitudes represents a ‘modest’ transcendental outlook, he nevertheless argues that the
general framework of the reactive attitudes ‘neither calls for, nor permits, an external ‘ra-
tional’ justiﬁcation’ (1962/2008: 25). There are two strands to Strawson’s defence of the
reactive attitudes, and to basic beliefs, attitudes, and practices more generally: one
21 For further discussion see e.g. Allen (2016: 183–185), and compare Allais’s (2014) suggestion in the case
of free will.
22 Compare a recent strand of Kant interpretation according to which Kant is a na€ıve realist about the phe-
nomenal world, e.g. Allais (2015), Gomes (2017).
23 Compare Putnam’s claim that ‘Winning through to natural realism [a form of na€ıve realism inspired by
James] is seeing the needlessness and the unintelligibility of a picture that imposes an interface between
ourselves and the world (1999: 41). Note that the claim that the rejection of na€ıve realism is needless
seems to be weaker than the claim that it is unintelligible; I return to this below.
24 See, for instance, Stroud (1968) and Strawson (1985).
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Humean, the other Kantian. The Humean strand emphasises the psychological impossibil-
ity of giving up the reactive attitudes, whereas the Kantian strand emphasises connections
between the reactive attitudes and other aspects of our conceptual scheme.25 In what
remains I will consider whether either of these lines of defence can provide the na€ıve
realist with a way of arguing that na€ıve realism is beyond external ‘rational’ justiﬁcation,
and I will conclude by tentatively suggesting a slightly different way of reaching the
Strawsonian conclusion.
The Humean line of argument for the claim that basic features of our conceptual
scheme are beyond external ‘rational’ justiﬁcation, and so can neither be vindicated nor
undermined, appeals to their psychologically inescapability. As Strawson argues in Skep-
ticism and Naturalism, where basic features of our conceptual scheme like this are con-
cerned, sceptical arguments and rational counter-arguments are:
equally idle—not senseless, but idle—since what we have here are original, natural, ines-
capable commitments which we neither choose nor could give up. (1985: 28)
This defence of basic elements of our conceptual scheme is modelled on Hume’s
response to scepticism about inductive reasoning and the existence of the external world,
and provides one way of understanding Strawson’s claim that determinism is ‘practically
inconceivable’ (1962/2008: 12): determinism is practically inconceivable in the psycho-
logical sense that we simply cannot believe it. Adapting this Humean line of argument in
defence of na€ıve realism, the corresponding thought would be that rejecting na€ıve realism
is practically inconceivable because the belief in na€ıve realism is an original, natural,
inescapable commitment that we neither choose nor could give up.
This suggestion raises two questions. First, is the psychological claim that we cannot
give up the commitment to na€ıve realism true? Second, if the psychological is true, is this
an adequate defence of na€ıve realism?
First, the psychological claim isn’t true in particular cases. That is, we are normally
able to distinguish between episodes of perception, in which we are in perceptual con-
tact with our environment, and episodes of illusion and hallucination, in which we are
not. Often we are only able to make these distinctions retrospectively, when further
experiences reveal the world to be other than we had taken it to be: for instance, when
we realise that what to took to be a stone on the path is in fact just a patch of light, or
when we try to touch a visual apparition. But sometimes it is possible to make the dis-
tinction between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases as you are perceiving. In some cases it is
possible to recognise the ‘bad’ case for what it is on the basis of the experience’s phe-
nomenal character, because the experience lacks the ‘sense of reality’ characteristic of
veridical perceptual experiences: this is often true, for instance, of real-world hallucina-
tions, in which objects are not presented at a determinate depth within a scene, or do
not appear to vary as we move in relation to them.26 In other cases, collateral informa-
tion is needed to know that an experience is not veridical. If you are familiar with the
Muller-Lyer illusion, for instance, you can know as you are perceiving that the lines are
really of the same length. In a more extreme case, if you remember taking the red pill,
25 For helpful discussion of the two different strands—and the tensions between them—see e.g. Putnam
(1998) and Stern (2003).
26 For further discussion of real-world hallucinations, see Farkas (2013) and Allen (2015).
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you can know as you are having them that your experiences within the Matrix are
systematically illusory.
The ability to distinguish between the ‘good’ and ‘bad cases’ in particular instances
plausibly presupposes, or is internal to, a more general framework or practice. As
Strawson says in the case of the reactive attitudes:
Inside the general structure or web of human attitudes and feelings of which I have been
speaking, there is endless room for modiﬁcation, redirection, criticism, and justiﬁcation.
But questions of justiﬁcation are internal to the structure or relate to modiﬁcations internal
to it. The existence of the general framework of attitudes itself is something we are given
with the fact of human society. (1962/2008: 25)
Similarly in the case of perception, the ability to distinguish between veridical and non-
veridical perceptual experiences arguably presupposes a general framework for thinking
about perception, such as that articulated by the na€ıve realist theory of perception.
Is it psychologically possible to call into question the entire framework within which
we distinguish between the ‘good’ and ‘bad cases’ on particular occasions? To the extent
that we are able to do this, it might seem that the belief that no experiences put us into
contact with the world, as the na€ıve realist understands it, is likely to be unstable. Na€ıve
realism forces itself upon us at every waking moment; even in the study, when we are
doubting the truth of na€ıve realism, we are thrown into the world through perception. As
Hume says, even though he thinks there are reasons for rejecting na€ıve realism, he never-
theless ﬁnds himself ‘absolutely and necessarily determined to live, and talk, and act like
other people in the common affairs of life (1739–40, 1.4.7).27
Still, to say that the belief that na€ıve realism is false is likely to be unstable is not yet
to say that it is impossible. And certainly there are many, including Strawson himself,
who seem from what they say to believe that na€ıve realism is false. It might be that those
who deny the truth of na€ıve realism hold different beliefs at different times, different
beliefs from different perspectives, or perhaps just simultaneously hold contradictory
beliefs—both that perceptual experience puts us into contact with the world in the way
that na€ıve realism articulates, and that na€ıve realism is false. But this is not yet to say
that they don’t believe that na€ıve realism is false.
Besides, even if the psychological claim is true and the commitment to na€ıve realism
is inescapable, the second and more important question is whether this would thereby
render na€ıve realism immune to falsiﬁcation; and it is by no means obvious that it would.
Strawson, for instance, argues that rational arguments on either side are idle where ‘origi-
nal, natural, inescapable commitments which we neither choose nor could give up (1985:
28) are concerned. But it is unclear why the fact that we neither choose nor could give
up these commitments puts them beyond external ‘rational’ justiﬁcation.28
One way of developing this point is by noting that, in effect, Strawson’s argument for
this claim appeals to an epistemic version of the principle of alternative possibilities.
27 Compare Strawson’s claim that we can adopt objective attitudes towards others when faced with abnor-
mal cases or in normal cases as a means of emotional self-defence, but ‘I do not think it is a point of
view or position which we can hold, or rest in, for very long. The price of doing so would be higher than
we are willing, or able, to pay; it would be the loss of all human involvement in personal relationships,
of all fully participant social engagement’ (1985: 34).
28 Compare e.g. Russell (1992), Valberg (1992), Stern (2003), Watson (2014).
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According to the principle of alternative possibilities, you can only be held accountable
for an action—either positively or negatively—if you were able to do otherwise. The
epistemic version of this principle that Strawson appeals to is that you can only be held
accountable for holding a belief—either positively or negatively—if you were able to be-
lieve otherwise.
The principle of alternative possibilities is normally associated with Strawson’s pes-
simists (incompatibilists and libertarians), and its rejection with Strawson’s optimists
(compatibilists). Consistent with his preference for a modiﬁed form of optimism, Straw-
son is himself sceptical of the pessimist’s appeal to the principle of alternative possibili-
ties. According to Strawson, to say of someone that ‘He could have acted otherwise’ is
not equivalent to saying that ‘There was no sufﬁcient natural impediment or bar, of any
kind whatsoever, however complex, to his acting otherwise’ (1992: 136). When we say
of someone that they could have acted otherwise, it is normally only with certain kinds
of potential impediment in mind—leaving open the possibility of obstacles of other
kinds. Moreover, if we deny that someone could have done otherwise because ‘It simply
wasn’t in his nature to do so’, this does not normally lead us to the regard the person’s
actions as beyond moral judgment—indeed, as Strawson notes, this kind of response
might actually lead us to reinforce our moral judgment of someone (1992: 137).
By the same token, it is plausible to suppose that whether or not a belief is justiﬁed
does not depend upon the absence of any kind of natural impediment to believing other-
wise. And just as in the moral case, saying that someone could not have believed other-
wise because ‘It simply wasn’t in his nature to do so’ does not obviously put that belief
beyond justiﬁcation. Yet the fact that certain commitments are inescapable—that it is in
our nature to believe them—is precisely what the Humean strand of Strawson’s solution
to sceptical challenges to our core common sense beliefs consists in.
Setting aside the Humean strand, Strawson’s work also suggests a more optimistic,
broadly Kantian line of reasoning in defence of the claim that basic beliefs, attitudes, and
practices are beyond external ‘rational’ justiﬁcation. In saying that the reactive attitudes
are beyond external ‘rational’ justiﬁcation, Strawson is aiming to rule out the possibility
of either undermining or justifying the reactive attitudes from a perspective distinct from
that of the engaged subject, such as the objective scientiﬁc perspective. But this leaves
open the possibility of justifying the reactive attitudes from within the perspective of the
engaged subject. Strawson’s discussion suggests two forms that this kind of internal
justiﬁcation can take.
First, we can consider whether experiencing particular reactive attitudes in particular
circumstances is appropriate. So, for instance, we can consider whether it is appropriate
to feel gratitude towards someone who has done something that beneﬁts us, even though
they did not do it out of good-will towards us but for some self-serving reason. Second,
and more generally, we can draw connections between different aspects of our conceptual
scheme, and thereby provide a kind of ‘connective’, ‘holistic’ or ‘horizontal’ justiﬁcation
of one part of our conceptual scheme in terms of another, without thereby transcending
our perspective. Strawson suggests the possibility of this more expansive form of internal
justiﬁcation when he states that ‘The existence of the general framework of attitudes
itself is something we are given with the fact of human society’ (1962/2008: 25). One
way of understanding this claim is as the claim that the reactive attitudes are a transcen-
dental condition of the possibility of ordinary interpersonal relationships (cf. Coates
2017). From the practical perspective, as agents engaged in ordinary interpersonal
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relationships, we cannot call into question the reactive attitudes that are a transcendental
condition of those relationships. The reactive attitudes are essential to our conception of
ourselves as humans engaged in inter-personal relationships. As such, these different ele-
ments of our conceptual scheme provide a ‘mutually supportive natural metaphysics’
(Strawson 1985: 29).
The na€ıve realist could again adopt a similar line of argument. First, we can consider
in particular cases whether our experience puts us into contact with the world, and here
there is ‘endless room for modiﬁcation, redirection, criticism, and justiﬁcation’. We are
able to explore our environments, look at things from different angles, under different
conditions, and perceive them via different sensory modalities. The different perspectives
that we are able to adopt on things allow us to improve, conﬁrm, or correct our experi-
ences without stepping outside of the engaged, perceptual perspective. In this respect,
there is a sense in which perceptual experience is self-justifying: doubts about the verac-
ity of experience can be answered by experience itself. Second, we can seek to justify
na€ıve realism holistically, on the grounds that it is intimately connected to, and perhaps a
transcendental condition of, our broader understanding of ourselves and our relationship
to the world that we inhabit. Just as Strawson claims that the framework of the reactive
attitudes is given with the fact of human society, the na€ıve realist can argue that ‘The
existence of the general framework of perceptual contact is something we are given with
the fact of the world’. Perceptual contact with the world is a condition of the possibility
of our engagement with the world. From the practical perspective, as agents engaged
with the world, we cannot call into the question the perceptual contact that is a condition
of that engagement; perceptual contact is essential to our understanding of ourselves as
humans engaged with a mind-independent reality. It is central to our understanding of
the world, others, the past, and the future.29
Of course, these kinds of internal justiﬁcation will only take the na€ıve realist so far.
On the one hand, to the extent that perceptual experience is self-justifying, it does not
provide the kind of independent justiﬁcation that someone who is sceptical of the truth
of na€ıve realism would want. If what is in question is the truth of the perceptual frame-
work that the na€ıve realist theory articulates, then perceptual experience cannot provide
an independent means of assuaging those doubts; the attempt to justify the perceptual
framework by perceptual experience would be circular. On the other hand, it might be
granted that na€ıve realism is enmeshed within a wider web of beliefs, but nevertheless
claimed that the whole web of beliefs in which it is enmeshed can, and should, be called
into question. This is not merely an abstract threat, either. After all, the very same kinds
of patterns of objective thinking that would lead someone to accept a common kind the-
ory of perception are likely to lead them accept corresponding views elsewhere: for
instance, that knowledge of the world is really just belief that meets some further condi-
tions which distinguish it from ‘bad cases’ of mere belief; or that action on things in the
world is a certain kind of bodily movement (or perhaps even just an attempt to move
your body) that meets some further conditions which distinguish it from ‘bad cases’ in
which you merely move you body (or merely try to move your body). The kind of objec-
tive thinking that threatens to undermine the na€ıve realist theory of perception
29 Compare Strawson’s claim that ‘it would be hard to separate the conception of objects which we have
and our acceptance of inductively formed beliefs from that conception of the past. All form part of our
mutually supportive metaphysics’ (1985: 29). The same is arguably true of perception.
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simultaneously threatens to undermine the general view of ourselves as beings-in-the-
world, which perception, as the na€ıve realist understands it, is an expression or manifesta-
tion of.
It may be possible for the na€ıve realist to go slightly further at this point. Without
providing a positive external justiﬁcation of the perceptual framework, they can at least
seek to show that the perceptual framework is not undermined by challenges from an
external standpoint. This kind of defence of basic elements of our conceptual scheme is
something that Strawson himself seeks to provide when he attempts to diffuse the ‘hard’
naturalist’s challenge, that not only is there is an incompatibility between the engaged
and the objective standpoints, but that the engaged perspective gives way to the objective
standpoint (1985: 36, 48–50). Strawson’s appeal to the relativity of ‘really’ goes at least
some way towards offering a rational defence of the engaged perspective: it is to say that
it is not undermined, in the way it might seem to be, by the availability of an alternative,
objective perspective. The variation on Strawson’s approach (suggested in §5) which
attempts to guarantee the compatibility of the two standpoints by seeing them as describ-
ing different aspects of one and the same thing fulﬁls a similar function. This is not a
purely internal justiﬁcation of the engaged perspective, since it involves transcending that
perspective in order to resist an external challenge to it. But it is still in keeping with the
spirit of a broadly transcendental approach insofar as it seeks to provide an explanation
of how it is possible that, for example, the reactive attitudes are appropriate or that per-
ceptual experience is relational.
However, this invites the following objection: to say that na€ıve realism is not impossi-
ble is not yet to provide a reason for accepting it. Indeed, you can imagine an opponent
of na€ıve realism saying something similar to Salmon in his criticism of Strawson’s
(1952) defence of inductive reasoning as reasoning that just is justiﬁed: reasoning which
is not justiﬁed because it is reliable, and not justiﬁed because we have independent
grounds for thinking it is reasonable. Salmon complains that this defence of inductive
reasoning elevates ‘inductive method to the place of an intrinsic good’, and ‘The result-
ing justiﬁcation of induction amounts to this: If you use inductive procedure you can call
yourself ‘reasonable’—and isn’t that nice!’ (1957: 42).30 Similarly, the opponent of na€ıve
realism might complain that the Kantian defence of the na€ıve realist’s view that percep-
tual experience is essentially relational has elevated perception as the na€ıve realist con-
ceives of it to the level of an intrinsic good. As such, the justiﬁcation of na€ıve realism
amounts to this: We take perception to put us into contact with the mind-independent
world—and isn’t that nice!
I want to conclude at this point by tentatively suggesting a slightly different way of
reaching the Strawsonian conclusion that na€ıve realism is beyond external ‘rational’ justi-
ﬁcation. Thinking of the visceral, even moral reaction, that the denial of na€ıve realism is
liable to provoke (§4), perhaps the na€ıve realist’s response to this challenge should be
‘Well, yes, it is nice—and it would be awful if the common kind assumption were true’.
It is at least in the spirit of Strawson’s claim that basic features of our conceptual scheme
neither require, nor permit, external ‘rational’ justiﬁcation to insist that the na€ıve realist
theory of perception is immune to falsiﬁcation because the reason for accepting na€ıve
realism is not primarily rational, but emotional or even moral. To deny naive realism is
to deny part of what it is to be human.
30 For further discussion of the Strawson–Salmon debate, see Putnam (1998) and Stern (2003).
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To say that the motivation for this kind of modest transcendental na€ıve realism is ulti-
mately non-rational might seem to put it at a disadvantage to other non-transcendental
philosophical theories of perception: both to common kind theories of perception that are
defended on the basis of the Arguments from Illusion and Hallucination, but also to
forms of na€ıve realism that are themselves defended on the basis of rational considera-
tions, as (for example) that which best explains the phenomenological character of per-
ceptual experience or the epistemic role of experience.
However, on the one hand, na€ıve realist theories of perception are liable to seem vul-
nerable if they are treated simply as one philosophical theory of perception amongst
others, to be assessed on the basis of a cost-beneﬁt analysis that weighs performance
along a number of different dimensions. Suppose, for instance, that na€ıve realism is trea-
ted as a philosophical theory of perception of the same order as sense-datum and repre-
sentationalist theories, and in arguing for it the na€ıve realist seeks to accord particular
importance to ﬁdelity to the appearances in deciding between then competing philosophi-
cal theories of perception. This then raises the question of why ﬁdelity to the appearances
should be accorded a particular, or indeed any, privilege in assessing philosophical theo-
ries of perception? As Hawthorne and Kovakovich put this challenge, for example, an
opponent of na€ıve realism may well ask ‘why vulgarity is to be celebrated’ (2006: 180)?
At best, it might be suggested that respecting the appearances is just one consideration
amongst many, one that provides a defeasible reason for accepting a philosophical theory
of perception, but which can be outweighed by costs or beneﬁts elsewhere. At worst it
might be suggested that respecting the appearances is simply not a relevant consideration,
any more than it would be if we were trying to explain why people believe in ghosts.
On the other hand, although there may be theoretical considerations (such as the Argu-
ments from Hallucination or Illusion) in favour of common kind theories of perception,
nevertheless the empirical facts do not obviously mandate these philosophical theories of
perception; we can at least make sense of the how na€ıve realism is possible, consistent
with the facts as we know them. Given that we can tell a story about how na€ıve realism
is possible, we are not compelled to reject na€ıve realism, or to accept that we are system-
atically mistaken about the nature of our experience. Why then should we reject it? In
these circumstances, rejecting na€ıve realism may look like an instance of what Strawson
elsewhere describes as ‘an extreme form of self-mortifying intellectual Puritanism’ (1985:
50).31
Bibliography
Allais, L. 2014. Freedom and Forgiveness, in D. Shoemaker and N. Tognazzini eds.
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, 2: 33–63.
2015. Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Allen, K. 2015. ‘Hallucination and Imagination’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93:
287–302.
2016. A Na€ıve Realist Theory of Colour. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
31 I would to thank York’s Mind and Reason Group and audiences at Winnipeg and Fribourg for discussion
of earlier versions of this material, an anonymous referee for their incredibly helpful comments, and Tom
Stoneham for suggesting the central comparison.
THE VALUE OF PERCEPTION 21
2018. ‘Perceptual Constancy and Apparent Properties’, in F. Dorsch and F.
Macpherson eds., Phenomenal Presence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 39–
57.
Forthcoming. ‘Merleau-Ponty and Na€ıve Realism’, Philosophers’ Imprint.
Armstrong, D. M., 1968 A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
Brewer, B. 2011. Perception and its Objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Broad, C.D. 1952. ‘Some Elementary Reﬂections on Sense-Perception’, Philosophy 27:
3–17.
Burge, T. 2010. Origins of Objectivity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Byrne, A. and Logue, H. 2008. ‘Either/Or’, in A. Haddock and F. Macpherson eds.,
Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.
57–94.
Campbell, J. 2002. Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
and Cassam, Q. 2014. Berkeley’s Puzzle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crane, T. and French, C. 2015. ‘The Problem of Perception’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/
Coates, D.J. 2017. ‘Strawson’s Modest Transcendental Argument’, British Journal for
the History of Philosophy 25: 4, 799–822.
Evans, G. 1982. Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Farkas, K. 2013. ‘A Sense of Reality’, in F. Macpherson and D. Platchias eds.
Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 399–415.
Fish, W. 2009. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Gomes, A. 2017. ‘Na€ıve Realism in Kantian Phrase’, Mind 126: 502, 529–578.
Hawthorne, J. and Kovakovich, K. 2006. ‘Disjunctivism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society Supplementary Volume 80: 145–183.
Hume, D. 1739–40. A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. D. Norton and M. Norton Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000.
Hyman, J. 1992. ‘The Causal Theory of Perception’, The Philosophical Quarterly 42:
277–296.
Kalderon, M. 2011. ‘Before the Law’, Philosophical Issues 21: 219–244.
2018. Sympathy in Perception. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
and Travis, C. 2013. ‘Oxford Realism’, in M. Beaney (ed.) Oxford Handbook of the
History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 489–517.
Logue, H. 2012, ‘Why Naive Realism?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112:
211–237.
Martin, M.G.F. 2002. ‘The Transparency of Experience’, Mind and Language 17: 376–
425.
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945. Phenomenology of Perception, trans. D. Landes. London:
Routledge, 2012.
McDowell, J. 1982. ‘Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge’, Proceedings of the British
Academy, 68: 455–479.
1994. Mind and World. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
1989. The Examined Life. New York: Touchstone.
22 KEITH ALLEN
Putnam, H. 1998. ‘Strawson and Skepticism’, in L.E. Hahn ed. The Philosophy of P.F.
Strawson. Open Court: Chicago and Lasalle, Illinois, pp. 273–287.
1999. The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Price, H.H. Perception. Methuen: London. Second edition (ﬁrst edition 1932.)
Robinson, H. 1994. Perception. London: Routledge.
Roessler, J. 2011. ‘Causation in Commonsense Realism’, in J. Roessler, H. Lerman, and
N. Eilan eds. Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 103–120.
Russell, B. 1959. My Philosophical Development. London: Allen and Unwin.
Russell, P. 1992. ‘Strawson’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility’, Ethics 102: 2, 287–
302.
Salmon, W. 1957. ‘Should we Attempt to Justify Induction?’, Philosophical Studies 8:
33–44.
Schellenberg, S. 2008. ‘The Situation Dependency of Perception’, Journal of Philosophy
105: 55–84.
Smith, A. D. 2002. The Problem of Perception. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Siegel, S. 2010. The Contents of Visual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Snowdon, P.F. 1998. ‘Strawson on the Concept of Perception’, in L.E. Hahn ed. The
Philosophy of P.F. Strawson. Open Court: Chicago and Lasalle, Illinois, pp. 293–
314.
Soteriou, M. 2013. The Mind’s Construction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stern, R. 2003. ‘On Strawson’s Naturalistic Turn’, in H-J. Glock ed. Strawson and Kant.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 219–234.
Stoneham, T. 2008. ‘A Neglected Account of Perception’, dialectica 62: 307–322.
Strawson, P. F. 1952. Introduction to Logical Theory. London: Methuen.
1959. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: Methuen.
Strawson, P.F. 1962/2008. ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Proceedings of the British
Academy, 48: 1–25; reprinted in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays.
London: Routledge, pp. 1–28
1979. ‘Perception and its Objects’, in G.F. Macdonald ed. Perception and Identity.
London: Macmillan, pp. 41–60.
Strawson, P. F. 1985. Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. London: Methuen.
1992. Analysis and Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, P.F. 1998a. ‘Reply to Hilary Putnam’, in L.E. Hahn ed. The Philosophy of
P.F. Strawson. Open Court: Chicago and Lasalle, Illinois, pp. 288–292.
1998b. ‘Reply to Paul F. Snowdon’, in L.E. Hahn ed. The Philosophy of P.F.
Strawson. Open Court: Chicago and Lasalle, Illinois, pp. 311–314.
Stroud, B. 1968. ‘Transcendental Arguments’, Journal of Philosophy 65: 241–256.
1984. The Signiﬁcance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
2000. The Quest for Reality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tye, M. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Valberg, J. J. 1992. The Puzzle of Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
THE VALUE OF PERCEPTION 23
Watson, G. 2014. ‘Peter Strawson on Responsibility and Sociability’, in D. Shoemaker
and N. Tognazzini eds. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, Volume 2.
Woodward, J. 2011. ‘Causal Perception and Causal Cognition’, in J. Roessler, H.
Lerman, and N. Eilan eds. Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 229–263.
24 KEITH ALLEN
